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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
--------------------------------------------------------------x
STEPHEN T. GREENBERG, M.D., P.C.
d/b/a GREENBERG COSMETIC
SURGERY, and STEPHEN T.
GREENBERG, M.D.,
Plaintiffs,

-against-

REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION
17-CV-5807 (SJF) (SIL)

PERFECT BODY IMAGE, LLC d/b/a
PERFECT BODY LASER AND
AESTHETICS, and JOHN DOE 1-5,
Defendants.
--------------------------------------------------------------x
STEVEN I. LOCKE, United States Magistrate Judge:
By way of Complaint dated October 4, 2017, Plaintiffs Stephen T. Greenberg,
M.D., P.C. doing business as Greenberg Cosmetic Surgery (“Greenberg Cosmetic”)
and Stephen T. Greenberg, M.D. (“Dr. Greenberg,” and together with Greenberg
Cosmetic, “Plaintiffs”) commenced this action against Perfect Body Image, LLC doing
business

as

Perfect

Body

Laser

and

Aesthetics

(“Defendant

or “Perfect Body”), asserting claims under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq.,
and N.Y. Civ. Rights Law §§ 50, 51, and for unfair competition under New York law.
See Complaint (“Compl.”), Docket Entry (“DE”) [1]. Presently before the Court, on
referral from the Honorable Sandra J. Feuerstein for Report and Recommendation,
are: (i) Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (“Fed. R. Civ. P.”) (“Plaintiffs’ Motion”), DE [64]; and (ii)
Perfect Body’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing this action in its
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entirety (“Defendant’s Motion”). DE [66]. For the reasons set forth herein, the Court
respectfully recommends: (i) denying Plaintiffs’ Motion its entirety; and (ii) granting
Defendant’s Motion and dismissing this action with prejudice.
I.

Background
A.
The

Relevant Facts
following

facts

are

taken

from

the

parties’

pleadings,

declarations/affidavits, exhibits, and respective Local Rule 56.1 statements. Except
where indicated, these facts are not in dispute.
Dr. Greenberg is a plastic surgeon, maintaining offices, inter alia, on Long
Island. See Plaintiffs’ Local Rule 56.1 Statement (“Pltfs.’ 56.1”), DE [64-2], ¶¶ 1-2;
see also Defendant’s Response to Pltfs.’ 56.1 (“Def.’s Reply 56.1”), DE [64-18], ¶¶ 1-2.
Dr. Greenberg operates his practice as Plaintiff Stephen T. Greenberg, M.D., P.C.
doing business as Greenberg Cosmetic Surgery. See Compl. ¶ 9. Plaintiffs perform
invasive surgical procedures as well as non-invasive laser treatments at their
facilities. See Defendant’s Local Rule 56.1 Statement [in support of its cross motion
for summary judgment] (“Def.’s 56.1”), DE [66-1], ¶¶ 9-10. In addition to his medical
practice, Dr. Greenberg has authored a book on cosmetic surgery, appeared on
television programs, and hosts a radio show. See Pltfs.’ 56.1 ¶3, Exs. B-G; see also
Def.’s Reply 56.1 ¶ 3. Perfect Body, which does not employ medical doctors and is in
no way affiliated with Plaintiffs, provides “non-surgical and non-invasive aesthetic
services, including, among other things, laser treatments.” See Def.’s Reply 56.1 ¶ 4;
Def.’s 56.1 ¶ 12; see also Affidavit of Patrick Scomello in Opposition to Plaintiffs’

2
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Motion for Summary Judgment (“Scomello Aff.”), DE [64-37], ¶¶ 3-4. 1 Stephen T.
Greenberg is not the only medical doctor with that surname practicing medicine in
his locale. Indeed, Stephen’s brother, Burt Greenberg, is also a plastic surgeon who
operates on Long Island and performs “laser treatments.” See Affirmation of Doreen
J. Shindel in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment (“Shindel Opp.
Aff.”), DE [64-19], ¶ 13, Ex. 10, DE [64-30]. In addition, Dr. William Greenberg is a
licensed physician who performs “laser treatments” in New York. See id. ¶ 14, Ex.
11, DE [64-31]. Dr. Greenberg has no registered trademarks for any iterations of his
name. See Def.’s 56.1 ¶¶ 1-5.
In September 2012, Perfect Body retained NASIKS Productions Inc.
(“NASIKS”) – an internet marketing agency that, among other things, manages its
clients’ search engine optimization – to assist in its online marketing, namely,
concerning advertising with Google, LLC (“Google”). See Scomello Aff. ¶ 7; see also
Affidavit of Nevin Soric in Opposition of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment
(“Soric Aff.”), DE [64-35], ¶ 2. 2 Businesses can utilize Google’s search engine tools
through a program called Google Ads to purchase select keywords to help target
specific customers performing various online searches. See Soric Aff. ¶ 6. Thus,
companies can bid on various keywords hoping to increase the likelihood of a given
advertisement appearing when a search term is entered. See id. The following

Mr. Scomello is the sole managing partner of Perfect Body and is in charge of its advertising and
marketing. See Scomello Aff. ¶ 1.
1

Mr. Soric is the President of NASIKS and has provided marketing consulting services to Defendant
since 2012. See Soric Aff. ¶¶ 1, 3.
2

3
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terminology relates to the efficacy of keyword searches: (i) an “impression” occurs
when an advertisement appears in the search results due to a purchased keyword
being entered; (ii) a “click” refers to instances where a user clicks on a business’s
advertisement, thereby being redirected to the linked website; and (iii) a “conversion”
occurs either when a user clicks an advertisement and then performs some activity
once reaching the website or if a user phones the business through the link provided
by the Google ad from a mobile device. See id. ¶ 6-7.
Within Google Ads, there are two types of keyword related advertisements –
both of which were used by Perfect Body in connection with the events leading to this
litigation. First, there are “static” advertisements, which refer to links displayed in
search results where the headline remains the same regardless of the parameters
entered. See id. ¶ 11. Additionally, there are “keyword insertion” advertisements,
which update the text in the link shown to include the language matching a
customer’s search terms. See id. ¶ 12. Thus, if someone enters a purchased keyword
in their search, Google uses computer code to automatically replace the text in the
advertisement with the term that triggered the link’s display. See id.
In October 2016, Perfect Body began an online marketing campaign entitled
“competitors” whereby they bid on and purchased search keywords from Google in an
effort to increase exposure to potential customers (the “Campaign”). See Scomello
Aff. ¶ 8; Soric Aff. ¶ 8. As part of the Campaign, Defendant purchased the keywords
“Dr. Greenberg,” “Doctor Greenberg,” and variations thereof. See Scomello Aff. ¶ 8;
Soric Aff. ¶ 8.

Defendant did not, however, bid on the rights to “Stephen T.

4
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Greenberg, M.D.” or any other use of Dr. Greenberg’s first name or middle initial.
See Def.’s 56.1 ¶ 22.

At the heart of the instant dispute is one advertisement

implemented by Perfect Body, which used the keyword insertion feature to display
“Dr. Greenberg” in the link to its website. See Soric Aff. ¶ 13. The following is a
screenshot demonstrating how Defendant’s keyword insertion advertisement was
displayed in Google’s search results (the “Advertisement”):

5
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See Declaration of Scott J. Kreppein in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary
Judgment (“Kreppein Decl.”), DE [64-1], ¶ 4(j), Ex. J, DE [64-13]. The Court notes
that this screenshot of the purportedly infringing conduct provided by Plaintiffs is
unauthenticated and presented without foundation. Plaintiffs merely indicate that
they attached an “Advertisement” as an exhibit, while providing no further
explanation.

See id.

In any event, the various submitted iterations of the

Advertisement (provided in support and opposition of the respective motions) at issue
illustrate the same general scenario, namely, a link to Defendant’s website with
“Doctor Greenberg” or “Dr. Greenberg” in the headline, followed by a separate link to
Plaintiffs’ own website below the complained of Advertisement. See, e.g., Shindel
Opp. Aff., Ex. 13, DE [64-33]. Each time the Advertisement was displayed in Google’s
search results, it was labeled by Google as an “Ad.” See Soric Aff. ¶ 15. When a user
clicked on the Advertisement, they would be redirected to Perfect Body’s website. See
id. ¶ 16. The Court is not aware of any allegations or evidence that Defendant’s
website itself referenced Dr. Greenberg once a user clicked through to it.
During the approximately 14 months that the Campaign was active – before
Perfect Body suspended it on December 7, 2017 – 36,654 “impressions” were made,
1,161 “clicks” occurred, and ten “conversions” happened. See Def.’s 56.1 ¶ 24; Pltfs.’
56.1 ¶ 6; Soric Aff. ¶ 14. The foregoing data appears to be derived from a response to
an information subpoena served on Google by Plaintiffs. See, e.g., Shindel Opp. Aff.
¶ 9, Ex. 7 (the “Subpoena”), DE [64-27]. The Subpoena sought information as to the
results of the Campaign on searches for “Doctor Greenberg” and “Dr. Greenberg.” See

6

Case 2:17-cv-05807-SJF-SIL Document 76 Filed 07/02/19 Page 7 of 32 PageID #: 6340

id. In support of their motion, Plaintiffs submitted excerpts from Google’s response,
see Kreppein Decl., Exs. M & N, DEs [64-16], [64-17], whereas in support of its motion,
Perfect Body included thousands of pages purporting to be the complete Subpoena
response. See Affirmation of Doreen J. Shindel in Support of Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment (“Shindel Support Aff.”), DE [66-3], ¶ 12, Ex. 11, DEs [67], [68].
Neither party tries to describe the data or explain its significance in any meaningful
way. In any event the parties agree as to the amount of impressions, clicks, and
conversions that occurred during the Campaign. See Def.’s 56.1 ¶ 24; Pltfs.’ 56.1 ¶ 6.
As such, the Court accepts these conclusions on their face for the purposes of this
motion.
As a result of the Campaign, Plaintiffs sent Defendant a cease and desist letter
on August 31, 2017 demanding that Perfect Body stop engaging in the foregoing
conduct. See Kreppein Decl., Ex. K, DE [64-14]. In response, Defendant asserted that
the Campaign was lawful. See id., Ex. L, DE [64-15]. Thus, the instant litigation
ensued.
B.

Relevant Procedural History

As set forth above, this action was commenced on October 4, 2017, and Perfect
Body suspended the Campaign on December 7, 2017. See DE [1]; see also Soric Aff.
¶ 14. The Complaint asserts three causes of action for: (i) trademark infringement
pursuant to Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a); (ii) a violation of
the right to publicity under Sections 50 and 51 of the New York Civil Rights Law; and
(iii) common law unfair competition. See Compl. Defendant answered the Complaint

7
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on December 18, 2017, see DE [12], at which point discovery commenced. See DEs
[15], [16].

After Judge Feuerstein initially extended the original July 9, 2018

discovery deadline to August 9, 2018, see July 20, 2018 Electronic Order, she denied
Defendant’s further requests to expand the discovery window. See DEs [43], [44].
Subsequent to the parties initially having their motions for summary judgment
denied for failure to comply with Judge Feuerstein’s Individual Rules, see October 3,
2018 Electronic Order, the parties re-filed their respective motions on October 19,
2018. See DEs [64], [66]. On October 25, 2018, Judge Feuerstein referred both
motions to this Court for Report and Recommendation. See October 25, 2018 Order
Referring Motion. Plaintiffs’ Motion seeks summary judgment (apparently as to
liability only) with respect to their three causes of action. See DE [64]. Defendant’s
Motion requests summary judgment dismissing this action in its entirety. See DE
[66].
II.

Legal Standard for Summary Judgment
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, a “court shall grant summary judgment if the

movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The movant bears
the burden of establishing that there are no issues of material fact such
that summary judgment is appropriate. See Huminski v. Corsones, 396 F.3d 53, 69
(2d Cir. 2004). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court “is not to weigh
the evidence but is instead required to view the evidence in the light most favorable
to the party opposing summary judgment, to draw all reasonable inferences in favor

8
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of that party, and to eschew credibility assessments.” Amnesty Am. v. Town of West
Hartford, 361 F.3d 113, 122 (2d Cir. 2004); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986) (holding that a motion
for summary judgment should be denied if “the evidence is such that a reasonable
jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party”).
Once

the

movant

has

met

its

initial

burden,

the

party

opposing summary judgment “must do more than simply show that there is some
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.... [T]he nonmoving party must come
forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Matsuhita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356
(1986) (internal quotation omitted); see also Maxton v. Underwriter Labs., Inc., 4
F. Supp. 3d 534, 542 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (“An issue of fact is considered ‘genuine’ when
a reasonable finder of fact could render a verdict in favor of the non-moving party”).
In determining whether summary judgment is warranted, “the court’s responsibility
is not to resolve disputed issues of fact but to assess whether there are any factual
issues to be tried, while resolving ambiguities and drawing reasonable inferences
against the moving party.” Knight v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 9, 11 (2d Cir.
1986); see also Artis v. Valls, No. 9:10-cv-427, 2012 WL 4380921, at *6 n.10 (N.D.N.Y.
Sept. 25, 2012) (“It is well established that issues of credibility are almost never to be
resolved by a court on a motion for summary judgment”).

9
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III.

Discussion
Applying the standards outlined above, and for the reasons set forth below, the

Court respectfully recommends: (i) denying Plaintiffs’ Motion its entirety; and (ii)
granting in Defendant’s Motion and dismissing this action with prejudice.
A.

The Lanham Act

Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act provides a cause of action for false designation
of origin against:
[a]ny person who … in connection with any goods or
services … uses in commerce any word, term, name,
symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false
designation of origin, false or misleading description of
fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which …
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of
such person with another person, or as to the origin,
sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or
commercial activities by another person, or (B) in
commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the
nature, characteristic, qualities, or geographic origin of his
of her or another person’s goods, services, or commercial
activities, shall be liable in a civil action by any person who
believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such
act.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1).

“[T]he same legal test applies to claims for trademark

infringement and false designation under the Lanham Act.” Alzheimer's Disease &
Related Disorders Ass'n, Inc. v. Alzheimer's Found. of Am., Inc., 307 F. Supp. 3d 260,
283 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (collecting cases).

“To prevail on a claim of trademark

infringement, a plaintiff must show, first, that its mark merits protection, and,
second, that the defendant's use of a similar mark is likely to cause consumer
confusion.” Brennan's, Inc. v. Brennan's Rest., L.L.C., 360 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir.
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2004) (citing Gruner + Jahr USA Publ’g v. Meredith Corp., 991 F.2d 1072, 1075 (2d
Cir. 1993); see also Van Praagh v. Gratton, 993 F. Supp. 2d 293, 301 (E.D.N.Y. 2014)
(to prevail on an infringement claim, a plaintiff must prove that it has a valid mark
entitled to protection and that the defendant’s use of the mark is likely to cause
confusion) (internal citations omitted).
i.

Validity of the Mark

In assessing whether Plaintiffs have any protectable marks, the Court initially
recognizes that “[b]oth registered and unregistered marks can constitute valid
trademarks under § 43(a).” CJ Prod. LLC v. Snuggly Plushez LLC, 809 F. Supp. 2d
127, 150 (E.D.N.Y. 2011). If a mark is registered with the Patent and Trademark
Office, “there is a rebuttable presumption that the mark is protectable.” DeClemente
v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 860 F. Supp. 30, 42 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (internal
citation omitted). Section 43(a), however, “is a broad federal unfair competition
provision” which affords protection to unregistered marks that would otherwise
qualify for registration. Van Praagh, 993 F. Supp. 2d at 301-02 (internal citations
omitted). “To be valid and protectable, a mark must be capable of distinguishing the
[services] it marks from those of others.” CJ Prod. LLC, 809 F. Supp. 2d at 150
(quoting Lane Capital Mgmt., Inc. v. Lane Capital Mgmt., Inc., 192 F.3d 337, 344 (2d
Cir. 1999)). “The central consideration in assessing a mark's protectability, namely
its degree of distinctiveness, is also a factor in determining likelihood of confusion.”
Id. (quoting Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Dooney & Bourke, Inc., 454 F.3d 108, 115 (2d
Cir. 2006)).

11
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In assessing whether a mark is distinctive and, thus, entitled to protection,
courts in the Second Circuit use four categories of classification, in ascending order
of strength: (i) generic; (ii) descriptive; (iii) suggestive; and (iv) arbitrary or fanciful.
Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976); see also
CJ Prod. LLC, 809 F. Supp. 2d at 150 (courts in the Second Circuit reference
Abercrombie’s classification scheme when determining a mark’s distinctiveness).
A generic mark is generally a common description of goods
and is ineligible for trademark protection.... A descriptive
mark describes a product's features, qualities or ingredients
in ordinary language, and may be protected only if
secondary meaning is established.... A suggestive mark
employs terms which do not describe but merely suggest
the features of the product, requiring the purchaser to use
imagination, thought, and perception to reach a conclusion
as to the nature of goods.... Fanciful or arbitrary marks are
eligible for protection without proof of secondary meaning
and with ease of establishing infringement.
Alzheimer's Disease & Related Disorders Ass'n, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 3d at 287 (internal
quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis added). “A mark can be descriptive in
two ways. It can literally describe the product, or it can describe the purpose or utility
of the product.” DeClemente, 860 F. Supp. at 43 (citing Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v.
McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., 973 F.2d 1033, 1040 (2d Cir. 1992)). It is well-established in the
Second Circuit that surnames are classified as descriptive marks. Rosenthal A.G. v.
Ritelite, Ltd., 986 F. Supp. 133, 139 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (collecting cases); see also
DeClemente, 860 F. Supp. at 43 (“Surnames or personal names used as trademarks
are generally regarded as descriptive marks”) (internal citations omitted).
Accordingly, a surname is only entitled to protection if it has acquired “secondary
meaning,” which occurs “when, through use, it becomes uniquely associated with a
12
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single source and the public is moved in any degree to buy an article because of its
source.” Rosenthal A.G. 986 F. Supp. at 139-40 (internal quotations and citations
omitted); see also Van Praagh, 993 F. Supp. 2d at 302 (“Personal names used as
trademarks are generally regarded as descriptive terms and are thus protected only
if, through usage, they have acquired distinctiveness and secondary meaning”) (citing
Shear Contractors, Inc. v. Shear Enterprises & Gen. Contracting, No. 09-cv-621, 2010
WL 4781335, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2010)).
“Proof of secondary meaning entails vigorous evidentiary requirements.”
Thompson Med. Co. v. Pfizer Inc., 753 F.2d 208, 217 (2d Cir. 1985) (internal brackets,
quotations, and citations omitted); see also DeClemente, 860 F. Supp. at 44
(“Secondary meaning is an essentially factual determination, proof of which entails
vigorous evidentiary requirements”) (internal quotations and citations omitted). In
determining whether a mark has acquired secondary meaning, courts in the Second
Circuit consider number of non-exhaustive factors: “(1) advertising expenditures; (2)
sales success; (3) unsolicited media coverage; (4) attempts to plagiarize the mark; (5)
the length and exclusivity of the mark's use; and (6) consumer studies linking the
name to a source.” CJ Prod. LLC, 809 F. Supp. 2d at 150-51 (citing Thompson Med.
Co., 753 F.2d at 217). “No one factor is determinative, and not all factors need to be
proved.” Id. at 151 (internal citations omitted).
Here, it is undisputed that Dr. Greenberg’s name is not a registered
trademark, see Def.’s 56.1 ¶¶ 1-5, and as such there is no presumption of validity and
Plaintiffs must establish secondary meaning to gain protection. To that end, the

13
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Court concludes that Plaintiffs fall far short of meeting the “vigorous evidentiary
requirement” of demonstrating that Dr. Greenberg’s surname has gained secondary
meaning.

Although the Court recognizes that secondary meaning is typically a

factual issue, the lack of evidentiary support submitted by Plaintiffs in support of
their motion is such that no reasonable factfinder could rule in their favor.
Notwithstanding Plaintiffs’ conclusory assertion that Dr. Greenberg is a “well-known
plastic surgeon,” see Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Summary
Judgment (“Pltfs.’ Mem.”), DE [64-2], at 3, the evidence submitted in support of their
motion fails to substantiate that position. Indeed, Plaintiffs’ seven paragraph Local
Rule 56.1 Statement and supporting exhibits are devoid of any proof concerning
advertising expenditures, sales success, the length and exclusivity of the mark’s use,
or consumer studies linking Dr. Greenberg’s name to his services.

Insofar as

Plaintiffs claim that Dr. Greenberg has received media coverage, the scattered
screenshots purporting to link articles from his own website are self-serving and
insufficient. See Kreppein Decl., Ex. G, DE [64-10].
Dr. Greenberg has published a book, see Kreppein Decl., Ex. B, DE [64-5], yet
he provides no data on the commercial success or recognition thereof. Plaintiffs also
assert that Dr. Greenberg is a radio and television personality, see id., Exs. D-F, DEs
[64-7] – [64-9]. With respect to television, Plaintiffs contend that “Dr. Greenberg was
a cast member on the Bravo television series, ‘Secrets and Wives,” see Pltfs.’ Mem. at
3, yet the mere screenshots they attach to their motion indicate that Dr. Greenberg’s
wife was the cast member on the program (with, perhaps, ancillary appearances from

14
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Dr. Greenberg himself). See Kreppein Decl., Ex. D, DE [64-7]. 3 Concerning Plaintiffs’
claim that Dr. Greenberg is a radio “personality” as a result of his “weekly radio
show,” their evidence is again meager as they only attach a screenshot implying that
as few as seven total radio shows have occurred. See id., Ex. E, DE [64-8]. Plaintiffs
present no evidence of listenership or any further details on the scheduling of Dr.
Greenberg’s purported radio appearances. In fact, Plaintiffs’ Motion does not include
any citation to deposition testimony or a single factual affidavit substantiating Dr.
Greenberg’s alleged notoriety. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Dr. Greenberg
has failed to meet the evidentiary burden required to establish secondary meaning
for his surname. For this reason alone, Plaintiffs’ Lanham Act claim fails.
ii.

Likelihood of Confusion

Assuming arguendo that Dr. Greenberg’s surname is entitled to at least some
protection, the Court nevertheless concludes that Perfect Body’s Campaign is, as a
matter of law, unlikely to cause confusion amongst consumers. Courts in the Second
Circuit consider “a series of nonexclusive factors likely to be pertinent in addressing
the issue of likelihood of confusion” outlined in the seminal case of Polaroid Corp. v.
Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961). Virgin Enterprises Ltd. v. Nawab,
335 F.3d 141, 146 (2d Cir. 2003) (collecting cases).
The Polaroid factors are: (1) the strength of the mark; (2)
the degree of similarity between the two marks; (3) the
proximity of the [services]; (4) the likelihood that the prior
owner will bridge the gap; (5) actual confusion; (6) the
Plaintiffs’ purported “Television Appearance List” also fails to establish secondary meaning, as they
merely present additional screenshots of “Television Segments” from Greenberg Cosmetic’s website
with no explanatory details on the specifics of these appearances. See Kreppein Decl., Ex. F, DE [649].
3

15
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defendant’s good faith in adopting its mark; (7) the quality
of the defendant’s [services]; and (8) the sophistication of
the buyers.
HomeVestors of Am., Inc. v. Fantini, No. 18-cv-3741, 2018 WL 4783969, at *2
(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2018) (citing Time, Inc. v. Petersen Pub. Co. L.L.C., 173 F.3d 113,
117 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal quotations omitted). “No single [Polaroid] factor is
dispositive, nor is a court limited to consideration of only these factors. Id. (citing
Brennan's, Inc., 360 F.3d at 130)). “The Court's resolution of each separate [Polaroid]
factor is a finding of fact, while the balancing of the factors is a conclusion of law.”
Alzheimer's Disease & Related Disorders Ass'n, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 3d at 284 (citing
Star Indus. v. Bacardi & Co., Ltd., 412 F.3d 373, 384 (2d Cir. 2005)).
Within the context of online advertising through the purchase of keywords,
“[t]he Second Circuit has yet to adopt a particular approach for determining the issue
of consumer confusion….” CJ Prod. LLC, 809 F. Supp. 2d at 158. Thus, courts
continue to consider the Polaroid factors when assessing infringement within the
realm of keyword advertising. See id. (collecting cases). In this regard, however,
“[v]irtually no court has held that, on its own, a defendant’s purchase of a plaintiff’s
mark as a keyword term is sufficient for liability.” Alzheimer's Disease & Related
Disorders Ass'n, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 3d at 284 (emphasis added) (collecting cases).
Accordingly, the “ultimate inquiry … [remains] whether there exists a likelihood that
an appreciable number of ordinarily prudent purchasers will be misled, or indeed
simply confused as to the source of the [services] in question.” Thompson Med. Co.,
753 F.2d at 213 (internal quotation, brackets, and citation omitted); see also Texas
Chicken & Burgers, LLC v. NYQ Prop., LLC, No. 17-cv-976, 2018 WL 6718843, at *7
16
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(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 2018) (“The crux of the inquiry is whether an appreciable number
of ordinarily prudent purchasers would be confused as to the source of the [services]
which they are purchasing or in distinguishing one product from another”) (internal
quotation and citation omitted).
As discussed below, the Court concludes as a matter of law that it is unlikely
that any appreciable number of ordinarily prudent purchasers would be confused by
Perfect Body’s Campaign, especially given the lack of any direct evidence of actual
consumer confusion.

In support of their motion, Plaintiffs rely almost entirely

unsubstantiated assertions, and fail to submit any deposition testimony, factual
affidavits, consumers surveys, or the like, by which a reasonable factfinder could
conclude that Defendant has engaged in infringing conduct. The Court first analyzes
the Polaroid factors before turning to additional relevant considerations.
a.

Strength of the Mark

When assessing the strength of the mark, the Court conducts the same
analysis as examining the mark’s validity. See HomeVestors of Am., Inc., 2018 WL
4783969, at *2 (citing Time, Inc., 173 F.3d at 117); see also CJ Prod. LLC, 809 F.
Supp. 2d at 150 (the distinctiveness factor of a mark’s protectability is also relevant
for the likelihood of confusion element). As discussed above, Plaintiffs have failed to
establish that Dr. Greenberg’s surname has acquired the secondary meaning needed
to be entitled to protection.

See Section III(A)(i), supra.

By way of example,

“[c]onsumer surveys can be the most persuasive evidence of secondary meaning
because they are direct evidence of the relevant consumer groups’ association of a
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service with a particular source.” Rockland Exposition, Inc. v. All. of Auto. Serv.
Providers of New Jersey, 894 F. Supp. 2d 288, 320 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (internal citation
omitted).

Here, however, no such surveys linking Dr. Greenberg’s name to his

services were performed. Although Dr. Greenberg has authored at least one book and
appeared in some capacity on television and radio, the extent to which these events
have gained him any notoriety in connection with his cosmetic surgery services is
unsubstantiated. Moreover, Plaintiffs have not established that consumers associate
Dr. Greenberg with Stephen as opposed to, say, his brother Burt, another plastic
surgeon practicing on Long Island, or a third Dr. William Greenberg also providing
similar services in New York. See Shindel Opp. Aff. ¶¶ 13-14, Exs. 10-11. Because
the purported mark is weak due to a lack of secondary meaning, the Court concludes
that this factor weighs in favor of Perfect Body.
b.

Degree of Similarity Between the Two Marks

“Under this factor, the Court analyzes the extent of similarity between the
marks to determine whether it is likely to cause confusion among consumers in the
marketplace.” CJ Prod. LLC, 809 F. Supp. 2d at 154 (citing Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc. v.
Allied Old English, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 123, 130 (S.D.N.Y.1993)). Here, insofar as
Plaintiffs claim that “Dr. Greenberg” is the protected mark, the use by Perfect Body
is virtually identical. Specifically, Defendant’s Campaign involved purchasing “Dr.
Greenberg” (or similar iterations thereof) as a Google search keyword, which resulted
in at least some links being displayed with his name appearing in the headline. See
Soric Aff. ¶¶ 8-13. Notwithstanding the fact that the remainder of Perfect Body’s
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Advertisement differed from Plaintiffs’ own link, Defendant’s use of Dr. Greenberg’s
surname, despite no affiliation to anyone by that name, weighs in Plaintiffs’ favor.
c.

Proximity of the Services

“The ‘proximity-of-the-[services]’ inquiry concerns whether and to what extent
the two [services] compete with each other.” Cadbury Beverages, Inc. v. Cott Corp.,
73 F.3d 474, 480 (2d Cir. 1996) (internal citation omitted). Once again, the record in
this regard is scant, and so the Court cannot fully ascertain the extent of competition
between the parties. Specifically, Plaintiffs’ Rule 56.1 Statement merely states that
Dr. Greenberg is a medical doctor who maintains a plastic surgery practice, and
provides no details on Defendant’s services, other than to say it is not affiliated with
Greenberg Cosmetic. See Pltfs.’ 56.1 and Def.’s Reply 56.1. ¶¶ 1-2, 4. In support of
its cross motion, Perfect Body does little to further illustrate the services provided by
either party.

Defendant claims that Plaintiffs provide “invasive and surgical

procedures” in addition to “non-invasive laser treatments,” and that Perfect Body
provides “non-invasive, aesthetic services, including, among other things, laser
treatments.” Def.’s 56.1 ¶¶ 9-12. Neither party endeavors to clarify what precise
procedures – surgical or otherwise – either business performs, nor do the parties
explain what “laser treatments” they are referencing. Thus, although it is reasonable
to deduce that there is likely some overlap in the services provided, the Court is
unable to assess this issue given the record before it. Accordingly, this factor does
not weigh in favor of either side.
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d.

Bridging the Gap

“‘Bridging the gap’ concerns the likelihood that a plaintiff ‘not in direct
competition with the defendant at the time a suit is brought will later expand the
scope of its business so as to enter the defendant's market.’” Alzheimer's Disease &
Related Disorders Ass'n, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 3d at 292 (citing Pretty Girl, Inc. v. Pretty
Girl Fashions, Inc., 778 F. Supp. 2d 261, 268 (E.D.N.Y. 2011)). This factor “is
inapplicable when the plaintiff and defendant already occupy the same market. See
Streetwise Maps, Inc. v. VanDam, Inc., 159 F.3d 739, 743 (2d Cir. 1998). Here, as
discussed in the preceding paragraph, the Court is unsure exactly what services the
parties provide. In any event, it appears Plaintiffs and Defendant operate in the
same market by virtue of providing “non-invasive … laser treatments.” See Def.’s
56.1 ¶¶ 10, 12; see also Plaintiffs’ Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion
for Summary Judgment (“Pltfs.’ Reply”), DE [64-39], at 11 (“The parties already
directly compete…”). Accordingly, this factor similarly does not weigh in either side’s
favor.
e.

Actual Confusion

“Evidence of actual confusion is ‘particularly relevant’ to whether a likelihood
of confusion exists.” CJ Prod. LLC, 809 F. Supp. 2d at 154 (quoting Streetwise Maps,
Inc., 159 F.3d at 745); see also Alzheimer's Disease & Related Disorders Ass'n, Inc.,
307 F. Supp. 3d at 293 (“The Second Circuit has made clear the prime importance of
actual confusion as a factor, even if no one factor is dispositive”).

Evidence of

confusion must be viewed in its evidentiary context and be causally related to the
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allegedly infringing behavior to be unlawful. See id. (internal citations omitted).
“However, ‘a likelihood of confusion is actionable even absent evidence of actual
confusion.’” CJ Prod. LLC, 809 F. Supp. 2d at 154 at 154-55 (quoting 1–800 Contacts,
Inc. v. WhenU.com, 309 F. Supp. 2d 467, 491 (S.D.N.Y.2003), rev'd on other
grounds, 414 F.3d 400, 406 (2d Cir.2005)).
Here, the lack of any evidence demonstrating that any consumer was confused
by the Campaign undermines Plaintiffs’ infringement claim. As discussed above,
Plaintiffs did not conduct a single consumer survey, nor did they submit any
testimonial evidence to support the conclusion that prospective customers were
confused. Cf. Alzheimer's Disease & Related Disorders Ass'n, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 3d at
294-95 (“most importantly, the [plaintiff] presented … survey evidence and opinion
testimony…. [S]urvey evidence is not evidence of actual confusion, [but] provide[s]
circumstantial evidence of the likelihood of confusion … where evidence of confusion
is not available or is not persuasive”). Conversely, in opposing Plaintiffs’ Motion and
arguing for its own entitlement to summary judgment, Perfect Body stated that it
was “not aware of any potential clients/consumers who have advised they contacted
Defendant with the mistaken impression they were contacting [Plaintiffs]” nor that
it had seen any evidence indicating the opposite was true. See Scomello Aff. ¶ 11. On
Reply, Plaintiffs make no attempt to rebut this contention, anecdotally or otherwise.
Instead, Plaintiffs rely entirely on circumstantial evidence in making the
untenable leap that there is “undisputably [sic]” evidence of confusion. See Pltfs.
Reply at 7. Specifically, Plaintiffs assert that – because internet browsers searching
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for Dr. Greenberg ultimately visited Perfect Body’s website – the 1,161 “clicks” and
ten “conversions” that occurred while the Campaign was active, see Def.’s 56.1 ¶ 24;
Pltfs.’ 56.1 ¶ 6; Soric Aff. ¶ 14, conclusively establishes actual confusion and, in turn,
liability. See, e.g., Pltfs.’ Mem. at 9 (“there can be no genuine dispute that Defendant’s
[Campaign] was likely to cause confusion…. The Google search terms provide
evidence of actual confusion”). The Court disagrees. Plaintiffs fail to causally link
the “clicks” to confusion. It is equally likely (absent contrary evidence from Plaintiffs)
that an individual browsing for cosmetic services began by searching Dr. Greenberg’s
name, and then visited Defendant’s website after seeing its advertisement,
understanding that they were indeed visiting a site other than Plaintiffs’. Moreover,
insofar as Plaintiffs contend that the raw data provided by Google in response to the
Subpoena demonstrates confusion, their failure to provide explanatory testimony
describing that data, and mere reliance on the results previously mentioned, breaks
any causal chain that would permit such a conclusion. Indeed, as Defendant points
out, Plaintiffs fail to specify whether the “clicks” came from the “keyword insertion”
Advertisement at issue, rather than the other “static” links used in the Campaign.
See Def.’s Memorandum of Law in Further Support of its Motion for Summary
Judgment (“Def.’s Reply”), DE [71], at 6. Accordingly, this factor weighs in Perfect
Body’s favor.
f.

The Defendant’s Good Faith in Adopting its Mark

“When analyzing the good faith factor … a court must consider ‘whether the
defendant adopted its mark with the intention of capitalizing on plaintiff’s reputation
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and goodwill….” Tiffany & Co. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 127 F. Supp. 3d 241, 251
(S.D.N.Y. 2015) (citing Lang v. Ret. Living Pub. Co., 949 F.2d 576, 583 (2d Cir. 1991)).
Additionally, “[e]vidence of intending to compete … does not necessarily indicate bad
faith…. Rather, good faith turns on a showing of intent to deceive purchasers as to the
source of a product.” Id. (citing Nora Beverages, Inc. v. Perrier Grp. of Am., Inc., 269
F.3d 114, 124-25 (2d Cir. 2001) (emphasis added).
Here, the Court is once again left with virtually no evidence establishing an
intent to deceive. On one hand, Perfect Body does not employ doctors, nor does it
have any estheticians with the surname Greenberg. See Pltfs.’ 56.1 ¶ 4; Def.’s 56.1
¶¶ 13-14. Thus, on its face, the Advertisement appears to be an attempt to lead
consumers browsing for Greenberg Cosmetic’s services astray. Notwithstanding,
Plaintiffs did not submit any evidence substantiating its conclusory claim that
“[t]here is no dispute that the mark was adopted in bad faith” because Perfect Body’s
Campaign was titled “competitors.” See Pltfs.’ Mem. at 9; Pltfs.’ Reply at 7. Because
an intent to compete does not equate to an intent to deceive, the Court declines to
make the evidentiary leap taken by Plaintiffs. In any event, the Court notes that this
factor is “[not] of high relevance to the issue of likelihood of confusion.” Virgin
Enterprises Ltd., 335 F.3d at 151. Specifically, although a finding of bad faith “can
affect the court’s choice of remedy or can tip the balance where questions are close[,]”
such a conclusion “does not bear directly on whether consumers are likely to be
confused.” Id. (citing TCPIP Holding Co. v. Haar Commc'ns, Inc., 244 F.3d 88, 102
(2d Cir. 2001)). Because of the limited record concerning Defendant’s intent, and
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considering the minimal weight given to bad faith in determining a likelihood of
confusion, the Court concludes that this factor does not weigh in favor of either party.
g.

The Quality of the Defendant’s Product

With respect to quality of the products, the record is similarly devoid of
adequate support.

As discussed above, both parties offer “non-invasive laser

treatments.” See Def.’s 56.1 ¶¶ 10, 12. In addition, while Plaintiffs are medical
doctors who provide “invasive and surgical procedures,” Perfect Body does not employ
doctors or perform surgical work. See id. ¶¶ 8-9, 13-14. As to the non-invasive laser
treatments that both parties offer, there is no evidence indicating that Plaintiffs are
more skilled in these unspecified procedures, nor that doctors in general are more
qualified in this respect.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ unsupported statement that

“Plaintiff is a medical doctor, while Defendant is not,” see Pltfs.’ Mem. at 9, holds little
weight, especially in light of the parties’ failure to expand on the specifics of their
businesses. As a result, this factor does not impact the Court’s analysis.
h.

The Sophistication of the Consumers

The sophistication factor “examines the extent to which a buyer evaluates a
[service] before purchase.” CJ Prod. LLC, 809 F. Supp. 2d at 155 (citing Kraft Gen.
Foods, Inc., 831 F. Supp. at 133). “A trial court must consider the general impression
of the ordinary consumer, buying under normal market conditions and giving the
attention such purchasers usually give in purchasing the product at issue.”
Streetwise Maps, Inc., 159 F.3d at 746 (citing W.W.W. Pharm. Co. v. Gillette Co., 984
F.2d 567, 575 (2d Cir. 1993)). Here, neither party has submitted any evidence as to
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the level of sophistication of the consumers at issue. Plaintiffs merely state that that
“laser treatments are not targeted towards a specialized sophisticated group, but
rather the general populous.” See Pltfs.’ Mem. at 9. This argument is without merit
as it does not even attempt to quantify the degree of due diligence a consumer in the
market for the parties’ services conducts. Defendant, on the other, hand asks that
the Court “take judicial notice that the majority of consumers interested in plastic
surgery will do their homework.” See Def.’s Opp. at 21. This contention similarly
misses the mark. A court “may judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable
dispute because it … is generally known within the trial court’s territorial
jurisdiction; or … can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose
accuracy cannot be reasonably questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201. It strains credulity to
assume that the sophistication of individuals interested in cosmetic surgery is
generally known or readily determinable such that judicial notice is appropriate.
Thus, this factor also does not weigh in favor of either party.
i.

Additional Considerations

Finally, the labeling and segregation of internet advertisements used by search
engines is an additional consideration affecting the likelihood of confusion in the
context of keyword bidding. See Alzheimer's Disease & Related Disorders Ass'n, Inc.,
307 F. Supp. 3d at 299. Specifically, Google’s use of “Ad” labels next to its sponsored
links “heightens consumers care and attention in clicking on the links, and further
diminishes the likelihood of confusion.”

Id. (citing Network Automation, Inc. v.

Advanced Sys. Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d 1137, 1153-54 (9th Cir. 2011)).
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In Alzheimer’s, the court was tasked not just with evaluating the bidding of
search keywords in a vacuum, but also to consider the effect of the keyword purchase
in conjunction with the resulting advertisements that were displayed. See 307 F.
Supp. 3d at 299. In that case, after an extensive review of a vast body of evidence
presented at a bench trial – including written acknowledgements of confusion,
evidence of checks being made payable to improper entities, and the results and
accompanying opinion testimony of two consumer survey studies conducted by an
economic consulting firm (each of which withstood Daubert scrutiny) – the court
concluded that no appreciable number of prudent consumers would be confused based
on the alleged infringer’s keyword advertising campaign. See 307 F. Supp. 3d at. at
273-80, 302. In reaching its conclusion, the court acknowledged that a “pure bait and
switch scenario” where a defendant purchases a competitor’s keyword and then
advertises itself as that competitor “with nothing in its ad to distinguish itself” from
the senior user, would be a “clear case of infringement.” Id. at 287. Notwithstanding,
“behavior meant to harm a competitor does not necessarily entail infringement if a
consumer is unlikely to be confused[,]” and so “the purchase of a competitor’s marks
as keywords alone, without additional behavior that confuses consumers, is not
actionable.” Id. (collecting cases).
Here, Defendant has admittedly done more than just purchased keywords
because its Campaign used Google’s keyword insertion feature, causing Dr.
Greenberg’s surname to be displayed in the headline of the Advertisement. See Soric
Aff. ¶¶ 10-13. Nevertheless, Perfect Body’s Advertisement adequately distinguished

26

Case 2:17-cv-05807-SJF-SIL Document 76 Filed 07/02/19 Page 27 of 32 PageID #: 6360

itself from the link to Plaintiffs’ own website appearing below. Specifically, the
Advertisement: (i) was labeled as an “Ad” and segregated from the non-sponsored
links; (ii) contained Perfect Body’s own URL in the text of the link; and (iii) indicated
that its services were “non-surgical,” whereas Plaintiffs’ links:

(i) appeared

separately from the sponsored links; (ii) included a link directly to Greenberg
Cosmetic’s website; and (iii) contained indications that the services offered were
surgical and performed by doctors. See e.g., Kreppein Decl. ¶ 4(j), Ex. J. Thus, the
Advertisement’s distinguishing characteristics minimizes any likelihood of confusion.
j.
In sum:

Weighing the Factors

(i) three factors (strength of mark, actual confusion, and

advertisement labeling/segregation) favor Perfect Body; (ii) five factors (proximity,
bridging the gap, bad faith, quality, and sophistication) weigh in neither side’s favor;
and (iii) only one factor (similarity of marks) weighs in Plaintiffs’ favor. In balancing
the Polaroid factors, however, the Court “must focus on the ultimate issue of whether
consumers are likely to be confused, rather than a numerical break-down of the
factors.” WE Media, Inc. v. Cablevision Sys. Corp., 94 F. App'x 29, 33 (2d Cir. 2004).
In this regard, the Court concludes that no genuine dispute of fact exists such that a
reasonable finder of fact could conclude that consumers are likely to be confused by
Perfect Body’s Campaign.

In making this determination, the Court affords

significant weight to the lack of secondary meaning associated with Dr. Greenberg’s
name (rendering the mark weak), in addition to the sheer lack of any evidence of
actual confusion. Accordingly, the Court respectfully recommends that Defendant is
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entitled to summary judgment dismissing Plaintiffs’ Lanham Act cause of action with
prejudice.
B.

Unfair Competition

The Court similarly recommends that Defendant is entitled to summary
judgment dismissing Plaintiffs’ common law unfair competition claim. “It is wellestablished that the elements necessary to prevail on causes of action for trademark
infringement and unfair competition under New York common law mirror the
Lanham Act claims.” Allied Interstate LLC v. Kimmel & Silverman P.C., No. 12-cv4204, 2013 WL 4245987, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2013) (quoting Lorillard Tobacco
Co. v. Jamelis Grocery, Inc., 378 F. Supp. 2d 448, 456 (S.D.N.Y.2005)); see also Van
Praagh, 993 F. Supp. 2d at 301 (Courts employ substantially similar standards when
analyzing claims under Section 43(a) and unfair competition under New York
common law) (internal citation omitted). In addition to the federal infringement
elements, a plaintiff seeking to establish a common law unfair competition claim
must also show that the defendant acted in bad faith. Alzheimer's Disease & Related
Disorders Ass'n, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 3d at 302 (“To prevail [on an unfair competition
claim], a plaintiff must establish the same elements as under the Lanham
Act, and demonstrate the defendant's bad faith”) (collecting cases) (emphasis in
original).
As detailed above, the lack of adequate evidence establishing either the
validity of Plaintiffs’ purported mark or a likelihood of confusion caused by
Defendant’s use thereof entitles Perfect Body to summary judgment on the Lanham
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Act claim. See Section III(A), supra. Moreover, Plaintiffs’ failure to demonstrate
Defendant’s bad faith, see Section III(A)(ii)(f), further undermines their unfair
competition cause of action. Accordingly, for the same reasons that the Lanham Act
claim should be dismissed, the Court respectfully recommends dismissing Plaintiffs’
unfair competition claim with prejudice.
C.

New York Civil Rights Law Sections 50 and 51

Finally, the Court respectfully recommends that Perfect Body is entitled to
summary judgment dismissing Plaintiffs’ N.Y. Civil Rights Law §§ 50 and 51 cause
of action with prejudice.
Section 50 of the New York Civil Rights law prohibits the use of a living
person’s name, portrait, or picture – for the purposes of advertising or trade – without
having first obtained their written consent. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 50. Section 51
provides for a private cause of action for such violations. See id. § 51; see also Groden
v. Random House, Inc., 61 F.3d 1045, 1048-49 (2d Cir. 1995). “The statute not only
encompasses a right to privacy … but also encompasses a right to publicity, which
protects the proprietary nature of [an individual’s] public personality.” DeClemente,
860 F. Supp. at 52 (citing Brinkley v. Casablancas, 80 A.D.2d 428, 438, 438 N.Y.S.2d
1004, 1009-10 (1st Dep’t 1981)) (emphasis added). “The definition of a person’s ‘name’
under the statute has been construed nearly literally such that only the use of a ‘full’
name, not just a surname is actionable.” Champion v. Take Two Interactive Software,
Inc., No. 158429-2018, 2019 WL 2079889, at *5 (N.Y. Cty. Sup. Ct. May 10, 2019)
(citing Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane & Bernbach, Inc., 58 A.D.2d 620, 622, 396 N.Y.S.2d
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661 (2d Dep’t. 1977)); see also People v. Scribner's Sons, 205 Misc. 818, 822, 130
N.Y.S.2d 514 (N.Y. Magis. Ct. 1954) (“the word ‘name’ as used in the statute means
a person’s full name and not merely his surname … unless … the surname standing
alone has been so used by the complainant as to be well known to the public as
identifying the complainant”) (internal citations omitted).
Here, there is no allegation or evidence that Perfect Body used Dr. Greenberg’s
full name – Stephen T. Greenberg, M.D – in any capacity. Instead, Plaintiffs merely
contend that, in connection with its Campaign, Defendant used Dr. Greenberg’s
surname or variations thereof for its keyword searches and the resulting
Advertisement. In addition, there are other Dr. Greenbergs practicing medicine in
New York, including Stephen’s brother, Burt Greenberg, another plastic surgeon on
Long Island, see Shindel Opp. Aff. ¶ 13, Ex. 10, undermining any claim that Dr.
Greenberg’s surname could identify only him. Accordingly, Perfect Body has not used
Dr. Greenberg’s name in a manner that violates the New York Civil Rights Law.
Plaintiffs’ reliance on Orsini v. E. Wine Corp., 190 Misc. 235, 73 N.Y.S.2d 426
(Sup. Ct. 1947), aff'd, 273 A.D. 947, 78 N.Y.S.2d 224 (App. Div. 1948), for the
proposition that a surname alone is a sufficient identifier is misguided. See Pltfs.’
Reply at 11.

In Orsini, the court found the use of a surname actionable, but only

because it was used in conjunction with the plaintiff’s unique coat of arms when the
defendant affixed both to its wine labels. See 190 Misc. at 235 73 N.Y.S.2d at 426.
Here, no such additional identifier was used by Perfect Body. Additionally, Plaintiffs’
argument that searching for Dr. Greenberg displays both Perfect Body’s
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advertisement as well as his picture misses the mark. See Reply Declaration of Scott
J. Kreppein (“Reply Decl.”), DE [64-38], Ex. B, DE [64-41], (“Google Search Results”).
The Google Search Results show several hits – one such result is Perfect Body’s
sponsored link, and another, separate from the Advertisement, is a picture of Dr.
Greenberg. The picture does not appear as a part of Defendant’s Advertisement in
any capacity. Thus, the Court concludes that Perfect Body has not used additional
identifying information in connection with Dr. Greenberg’s name such that Plaintiffs
are entitled to protection under the statute. Accordingly, the Court respectfully
recommends dismissing Plaintiffs’ N.Y. Civil Rights Law §§ 50 and 51 cause of action
with prejudice.
IV.

Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the Court respectfully recommends:

(i) denying Plaintiffs’ Motion its entirety; and (ii) granting Defendant’s Motion and
dismissing this action with prejudice.
V.

Objections
A copy of this Report and Recommendation is being served on all parties by

electronic filing on the date below.

Any objections to this Report and

Recommendation must be filed with the Clerk of the Court within 14 days of receipt
of this report. Failure to file objections within the specified time waives the right to
appeal the District Court’s order. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a); Ferrer
v. Woliver, 05-3696, 2008 WL 4951035, at *2 (2d Cir. Nov. 20, 2008); Beverly v.
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Walker, 118 F.3d 900, 902 (2d Cir. 1997); Savoie v. Merchants Bank, 84 F.3d 52, 60
(2d Cir. 1996).
Dated:

Central Islip, New York
July 2, 2019

/s/ Steven I. Locke
STEVEN I. LOCKE
United States Magistrate Judge
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